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INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose ofthe country studies assembled in this book is to examine 
systematically how late employment careers, the timing of retirement and the 
level of pension incomes have changed over the last decades in the course of 
globalization, economic restructuring and demographic aging in a wide range 
of European and North American countries (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States). Not so long ago, the late employment career was considered to 
be a relatively stable phase in the life of workers, and early retirement a se cure 
bridge into a comparatively well-paid pensioner's life. Of course, countries 
have always differed somewhat in the paths they travel. Early retirement was 
the major option installed to ease a tight labor market in countries such as 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, or Spain, whereas in societies shaped more 
strongly by the liberal market ideology (United Kingdom, United States) or by 
the goal of full employment (Denmark, Sweden), working until higher ages 
was fostered either passively or actively. Nonetheless, in modem societies, a 
relatively secure late employment career with lower than average or only 
average unemployment risks and a trend toward retiring early were visible 
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and partially the 1990s (Kohli et al. 1991; 
Blossfeld, Buchholz and Hofácker 2006). 
However, macro-economic as well as demographic dynamics have 
changed over time, and public pension policies have been redirected. 
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Globalization has introduced an ever more speedy process of change into the 
economic sphere and has decreased the predictability of events, obliging 
actors at aH levels to be more flexible in order to deal with increased 
uncertainties. For employees, this practicaHy means higher risks of 
unemployment and of precarious work and, therefore, a greater instability of 
working biographies in general. However, these risks do not grow linearly 
during the course of globalization, because national labor markets still go 
through recessions and booms - that are linked in complex ways to global 
economic processes. In a booming economy, labor market risks are expected 
to be clearly lower than during times of recession. 
Furthermore, as a number of studies have shown, labor market risks do not 
strike workers evenly in aH phases of their employment career, and it is 
particularly young people entering the labor market who are confronted with 
higher risks. However, we believe that workers in the late phase of their 
career are also exposed to increasing labor market risks, especiaHy because a 
large proportion of them work in traditional industries that have been hit hard 
by the economic restructuring accompanying intensified global competition. 
Moreover, the speed of technological change that comes with increased 
economic competition is also a threat for older workers, because they 
received their vocational training decades ago, and retraining is typically not 
seen as an efficient strategy for workers who have only a few more years in 
employment. In addition, many countries have severely cut back the most 
prominent exit option for older workers, early retirement programs, and have 
introduced or strengthened private pension schemes in recent years. A main 
reason for these policy adjustments is that public budgets have been under 
heavy strain for years because of high levels of unemployment and rising 
numbers of pensioners relative to the number of young workers (linked to 
demographic aging and the trend to early retirement). Thus, there are several 
arguments leading us to the apprehension that the labor market chances of 
older workers and the incomes of recent pensioners have deteriorated 
compared to their predecessors. 
To be sure, similar to young people, risks among older people are unlikely 
to be spread evenly. We expect a growth ofinequalities between occupational 
classes and educational groups because those with relatively weak labor 
market positions, such as low-skilled manual workers in the manufacturing 
industry, are likely to be hit hardest by cutbacks in early retirement options. 
Without the exit option of early retirement, these workers are likely to end 
their working lives in unstable and low paid jobs with subsequently low 
pensions. Furthermore, the introduction or strengthening of private pensions 
favors workers with medium or high wages and, thereby, constitutes a further 
factor strengthening inequalities. 
In sum, we expect the following general trends (see, for details, Chapter 1): 
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1. An increase ofunemployment risks and downward income mobility in the 
late employment career, 
2. A decline of early retirement, 
3. A lowering of pensions as a result of employment instability, decreasing 
wages and pension reforms, 
4. Increasing inequalities between occupational classes with respect to labor 
market risks and pension entitlements. 
However, national institutional frameworks might impact heavily on the 
strength and specific expression of the expected trends. Hence, one of our 
main aims was to find evidence for the diverse filtering processes of macro 
socio-economic trends through national contexts and policy measures. As 
outlined in the introquctory chapter, we start from the assumption that the 
countries under study' are shaped by different traditions with respect to their 
employment relations systems, their occupational systems and their welfare 
state and pension systems. Ideal-typically we distinguished four regimes (see, 
for more details, Chapter 1 in this book): (1) the conservative regime with the 
Netherlands and Germany, (2) the liberal regime ofthe United States and the 
United Kingdom, (3) the social democratic (or Scandinavian) regime with 
Sweden and Denmark, and (4) the fragmented (or Southem European) 
re gime with Spain and Italy. Fifth, we distinguish a post-socialist regime with 
Hungary and Estonia. Yet, it has to be noted that countries in this final 
regime can still not be clustered unequivocally, even though they are similar 
in having experienced a profound transformation from a state socialist society 
to a Westem-type capitalist regime. Their paths have also diverged, with 
Estonia following a much more liberal route than Hungary that took a 
direction closer to that of Continental European welfare states. 
We expect that the effects of macro socio-economic forces on workers' 
and pensioners' lives are shaped in a clearly pattemed way by the 
aforementioned national contexts. But before we go into details on our 
specific expectations and confront them with empirical results, it is useful to 
summarize the basic characteristics of the country study designs, the 
empirical data available for the analyses and the statistical methods used. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Given the aim of analyzing change over time, both between birth cohorts as 
well as within the life courses of the elderly, almost all country studies 
employed longitudinal micro-data on individuallife courses over an extended 
period of historical time. To analyze the late employment career, the country 
studies focused on individual risks of unemployment and re-employment 
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Table 12.1 Periods, age spans and cohorts analyzed with the number 01 
cases by country and type 01 analysis 
Unemp10ymenta Downward income mobilityb 
Period Age Cohorts Persons Age Cohorts Persons 
Germany 1984-2007 50+ 1934-51 3,108 50+ 1934-51 3,108 
Netherlands c 1990-2001 50-64 1939--46 1,564 50-64 1939--46 1,224 
lta1y 1980-2005 50-65 1930-54 2,443 
Spain 1981-2006 58-65 1941-48 5,726 
UK 1991-2006 50+ 1940-55 1,265 
United States 1981-2006 50+ 1931--41 4,972 50+ 1931--41 4,065 
Denmark 1980-2006 50-65 1930-56 72,917 50-65 1930-56 63,611 
Sweden d 1981-2007 51-64 1931-51 47,629 52-64 1931-51 6,059 
Estonia e,f 1981-2004 50+ 1940-54 902 50+ 1930-54 2,335 
Hungary 1988-2003 40+ 1934--48 938 
Retirement Pension income 
Period Age Cohorts Persons Age Cohorts Persons 
Germany 1984-2007 50+ 1934-51 3,415 50+ 1934-51 1,206 
Netherlands 1990-2001 50-65 1939--46 3,329 50-65 1939--46 1,000 
ltaly 1980-2005 50+ 1930-54 2,528 
Spain 1981-2006 58-65 1941--48 5,726 50+ 1901-54 945 
UK 1991-2006 55+ 1935-50 1,533 50+ 1940-55 1,250 
United States 1981-2006 50+ 1931--41 5,094 50+ 1931--41 7,139 
Denmark 1980-2006 50-69 1930-56 78,020 50+ 1930--41 19,738 
Sweden 1981-2007 60+ 1931--47 46,147 60+ 1931--47 22,248 
Estonia 1981-2004 50+ 1930-54 2,378 
Hungary 1988-2003 40+ 1934--48 938 50+ 1929-53 913 
Source: Own illustration. 
Notes: 
Blank cells indicate that no models were implemented. 
a Unemployment status is determined by self-assessment or was provided by register data. 
b Downward income mobility implies a salary los s ofat least lO percent. 
e Analyses for the Netherlands refer to all transitions out of employrnent. 
d Analyses on income mobility refer to mobility after unemployrnent. 
e The period covered for the analyses on unemployrnent was 1990 to 2004. 
f Due to data restrictions, the mobility analysis addressed occupational mobility. 
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along with income mobility; to analyze retirement, the focus was on the 
timing of the transition to retirement and on pension incomes. Table 12.1 
provides information on the basic characteristics of the data used for these 
analyses in the countries of our study. For Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United States, observations started in 
the 1980s; for the other countries, at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
observation window ended in 2005 or later in aH countries except for Estonia 
(2004), Hungary (2003) and the Netherlands (2001). Individuals' working 
lives were observed from age 50 (except for HungatY). Cross-national 
comparisons are possible because all data sets contained information on the 
generations bom during the 1930s and the 1940s; the only exception being 
the United States, where generations bom after 1941 could not be taken into 
account. For sorne copntries like Denmark, Estonia and Italy, people bom 
during the first half of the 1950s were also followed. At the same time, it 
must be pointed out that analytical strategies had to adapt to the 
characteristics ofthe available data sets. For instance, analyses on mobility in 
Estonia focused on occupational mobility and not on income mobility, 
because income information was not available in the data. Analytical 
strategies are also a consequence of choices made by authors about what is 
empiricaHy relevant in each given country. For example, detailed analyses on 
re-employrnent after retirement ('unretirement') were conducted only for the 
United States, because this transition is relevant in this country alone and not 
in the others included in our study. 
The statistical methods employed were, on the one hand, transition rate 
models (Blossfeld, Golsch and Rohwer 2007; Yamaguchi, 1991) for the 
analyses on the risk of unemployrnent, re-employrnent, income mobility, and 
retirement timing; and on the other hand, OLS regressions and growth curve 
models for the analyses on pension incomes. 
MAIN FINDINGS 
The empirical findings surnmarized in the following are based on the 
country-specific individual level microanalyses. Besides our expectations on 
general trends, we formulated specific hypotheses on how macro-economic 
developments such as increased global competition and economic 
restructuring impact on employees and pensioners within different regime 
types. 
For the conservative regime, we assumed that the long-standing trend 
toward early retirement has come to a halt in order to reduce the strong 
burdening of the pension systems. Indeed, the authors of the German and 
Dutch country studies in this book find clear changes in their countries' 
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pension policies in the past years. As the institutional assessment of both 
countries shows, early retirement options as well as welfare state subsystems 
such as unemployment insurance in Germany and disability pensions in the 
Netherlands have been cut back severely in recent years. The main question 
for these countries is whether today's older workers have to struggle 
increasingly with employment instabilities and financial insecurities. This 
question is based on the assumption that the latest pension policy reforms in 
these countries expecting older employees to prolong working life were not 
accompanied by changes in other institutional features that would also enable 
them to remain employed. For example, Germany and the Netherlands still 
lack an elaborated infrastructure for lifelong leaming and exhibit closed 
employment relationships hindering easy reentries into employment. 
Therefore, we expected increasing employment risks particularly in these 
countries that originally strongly supported early and generous employment 
exits. However, we also anticipated social inequalities to be on the rise, 
because it is especially low qualified workers who are unable to meet the new 
expectations and are at the same time no longer compensated for their early 
withdrawal from employment by generous pension regulations. 
Indeed, in line with our expectations, we find the most recent cohorts are 
retiring later than earlier ones in Germany. Especially the unemployment 
pathway to retirement became less prominent in younger cohorts, whereas it 
was a commonly used and financially supported early retirement pathway in 
older cohorts. Yet, as the German country study shows, lower qualified 
members of recent cohorts were unable to profit much from these latest 
developments. Instead, this part of the older workforce still has to make use 
of the unemployment pathway to retirement - however, with major financial 
cutbacks and a significant reduction of the later pension income compared to 
earlier cohorts. Unfortunately, due to data restrictions, we are unable to 
capture the latest changes in the Netherlands because the existing data 
document developments only until 2001. However, for both countries - even 
when taking into account the latest postponement ofretirement in Germany-
the majority still retires before mandatory retirement age. Thus, a significant 
share of the older workforce still does not meet the expectation of prolonged 
working life. For Germany, we observe the well-known class- and education-
specific pattem that low qualified employees - primarily those in the 
manufacturing industries - retire earlier than other workers. These 
developments are - in line with our expectations - accompanied by an 
increase of downward and a decrease of upward income mobility in 
Germany. 
In sum, our expectations for the conservative regime were supported by 
the country studies for Germany and the Netherlands. In both countries, we 
find policy changes that expect people to prolong working life. However, as 
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anticipated, early retirement is still very prominent in both countries, even 
when the latest developments in Germany are taken into account. At the same 
time, however, results indicate a strengthening of inequalities between high-
and low-skilled workers with respect to unemployment risks in Germany that 
are now connected with a significant reduction in pension income. All in all, 
these results highlight that in conservative countries, which traditionally 
offered generous early retirement programs in order to relieve the regulated 
labor market, the latest changes in pension policies have been connected with 
a growing cleavage between those older workers who are able to meet the 
new expectations of the pension system and those who fail to do so and have 
to pay for this 'failure'. 
In contrast to our expectations for the conservative regime, we anticipated 
early retirement in th, Southem European regime still to be an attractive 
retirement path simply because the govemments of Spain and Italy only quite 
recently introduced pension reforms targeting mostly future retirement 
cohorts. As a result, early exit pathways are still largely open and financially 
attractive for today's older workers. In fact, our earlier research (Blossfeld et 
al. 2005, 2008) has shown that in the Southem European countries with their 
strong insider/outsider boundaries, it is especially labor market entrants and 
young cohorts who face high labor market risks and are hardly covered by 
welfare systems. In contrast, former insiders and pensioners are (still) highly 
protected. Therefore, we also did not expect a steep increase in instabilities in 
the late career and a rise in inequalities, given the still existing generous early 
retirement exit option. 
Indeed the results for Italy and Spain show that there has been only a 
small rise in the retirement age. With respect to changes within the late 
employment career, the Italian study reveals a slight growth in 
unemployment risks for younger birth cohorts? Finally, pension incomes do 
not seem to have declined across cohorts in Italy. For Spain, analyses on 
changes in the late employment career or in pension incomes were not 
rigorously comparable due to data restrictions. Thus, we can summarize that 
elderly workers and pensioners cannot be considered particularly at risk in 
Italy due to the early retirement options and the still very generous income 
replacement rates ofpensions at least up to 2005. However, one has to bear in 
mind that a sizeable share of the workers in Italy are not covered by the 
pension system due to self-employment or informal work. Thus, the 
fragmented regime in Italy protects only part ofthe elderly. 
The countries in the social democratic cluster, Sweden and Denmark, differ 
in several respects from those in the conservative and fragmented regimes. 
Although early retirement schemes have also been important in these countries, 
retirement typically did not take place quite as early as in the other countries 
discussed so faro Especially Sweden has had a long-standing tradition of 
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fostering employment through active labor market policies and keeping all men 
and women in employment up to relatively high ages. All in all, we therefore 
did not expect a strong rise in employment instabilities; in particular, not in 
downward mobility. However, because the Danish labor market is 
characterized by weak employment protection, unemployment risks should be 
higher there. Keeping social inequalities low by tax and social policy measures 
is another prime feature of the social democratic welfare states of Scandinavia. 
Accordingly, the pension system is characterized by a strong public pillar. 
However, both countries have introduced individualizing pension elements in 
recent years. Thus, we suspected that even in the Scandinavian world, income 
inequalities among pensioners might have been growing. 
The empirical results reveal that retirement has been delayed to a 
somewhat higher age in more recent birth cohorts in both countries. This is 
due to pension reforms cutting back early retirement incentives. Furthermore, 
the analyses point to unemployment risks being strongly influenced by 
macro-economic conditions. In the most recent years covered by the data, 
these have been relatively good and unemployment risks have declined. At 
the same time, however, inequalities between educational levels in 
unemployment risks have grown somewhat across cohorts in Denmark, but 
not in Sweden. Still, the re-employment chances of unemployed persons are 
quite high in both countries, which is in line with our expectation of the late 
career being quite stable in the Scandinavian world. Getting back into 
employment is clearly more likely than in all the other countries - with the 
exception of the United States - pointing to the success of retraining 
measures in Sweden and Denmark. With respect to downward income 
mobility during the late career, the empirical analyses found no change across 
cohorts in Denmark and a decline in Sweden. Finally, there are no signs yet 
that pension incomes have decreased across cohorts. Quite in contrast, there 
has been a significant growth in average pension levels in both countries. 
However, according to the empirical analyses for Sweden, the gap in pension 
incomes between high and low educationallevels has widened across cohorts 
pointing to an increase in social inequalities over time. 
In sum, we observe no general worsening of late careers and pension 
incomes in the two Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, there are signs of 
increasing inequalities between educational levels in both: in Denmark, 
linked to the relatively direct impact of market forces on labor market 
chances in the Danish employment system; in Sweden, related to the 
individualization of pension plans. Still, compared to other regimes, the 
strengthening of inequalities is relatively moderate. 
Yet another interesting case is presented by the liberal regime with the 
examples of the United Kingdom and the United States. To a greater extent 
than in the conservative, Southem European and Scandinavian regimes, labor 
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market participants in the liberal regime are exposed directly to market 
forces, and the economic well-being of individuals is highly market-
dependent due to a weak welfare state. This makes it likely that the 
employment risks and financial insecurities of older people (as well as of 
people in early and mid-career) are relatively high and strongly dependent on 
economic ups and downs. Although early retirement options have never been 
implemented as extensively as in the conservative and fragmented regimes, 
they were also offered in the liberal regime. Thus, we anticipated sorne 
increase of retirement age due to cutbacks of earIy retirement options. 
Finally, we suspected pronounced inequalities between occupational classes 
(and educational groups) with respect to late career instabilities and pension 
levels, given the weakness of alleviating social policies and the restricted 
relevance of public p~nsions in the United Kingdom and the United States 
compared to other countries. 
The empirical results are in line with our expectations. Risks of 
unemployment 4 and income mobility in either direction are relatively high. 
Unemployment risks, but also re-employment chances, have increased across 
cohorts in the United States. Furthermore, both countries reveal a clear link 
between macro-economic developments and late career employment and 
income chances. In general, age at retirement has risen slightly across cohorts 
in both countries, due to not only restrictions in early retirement regulations 
but also - in the case of the United Kingdom - improved employment 
chances in a booming economy. Moreover, in the United States, the timing of 
retirement depends increasingly on unemployment rates and stock market 
development. These macro-economic trends have a growing impact, because 
public pensions have been curtailed and private pensions and defined-
contribution occupational pension plans have become more important in 
recent years in the United States. Whereas pension incomes have generally 
increased across cohorts in the United Kingdom, in the United States, in 
contrast, there is a clear trend toward lower levels of public pensions (due to 
pension reforms) accompanied, however, by a rise in average levels of 
prívate pensions. Most importantly, though, we observe a trend toward 
'unretirement' in the United States, meaning that pensioners return to 
employment to make ends meet given the low pension incomes they receive. 
This trend is most pronounced in the youngest cohorts of pensioners in the 
United States. Regarding the development of social inequalities, the analyses 
detected no consistent general tendency toward more social inequality 
between occupational class positions or educational levels in either the 
United States or the United Kingdom. However, one has to bear in mind that 
inequality was relatively high in these countries to begin with. Nevertheless, 
the United States study reveals increasing inequalities between educational 
levels in the risk of unemployment for men as well as in the risk of 
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unretirement (for men and women). For the United Kingdom, analyses show 
increasing inequalities between occupational classes in the chances of 
upward mobility and in pension incomes across cohorts. This means that in 
both countries, those at the low end of the educational or occupationalladder 
have experienced growing problems in sorne aspects oftheir late employment 
career and their retirement phase. 
Finally, for the two Eastem European countries in our study we expected 
much larger changes across cohorts than in all other countries given the 
transition from a socialist to a capitalist regime. This transition was marked by 
liberalization, privatization and an opening up to global competition. The 
socialist right-to-work ideology was replaced by the rule of market and 
efficiency principIes. Consequently, many workers were laid off, in particular, 
elderly workers who were disproportionately employed in the shrinking 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors and as low qualified employees. Thus, 
we expected a tremendous rise of late career risks (in particularly, 
unemployment), an increase in early retirement during the transition phase, 
and generally a growth of inequalities between occupational classes. At the 
same time, we suspected market dependencies and social inequalities would 
be stronger in Estonia, because this country has struck a more liberal path with 
respect to employment protection and welfare state than Hungary. 
The empirical results for Estonia and Hungary are quite clear-cut. Early 
retirement was typical in both countries during the transition period, but this 
trend reversed during the course of the 1990s due to pension reforms and the 
improved macro-economic situation. In Hungary, the extended use of 
disability pensions compensated partially for the reduction of early retirement 
options. Unemployment risks have grown across cohorts in both countries 
and are linked closely to macro-economic trends. During the transition 
period, unemployment risks were lower in Hungary than in Estonia, because, 
in the former, redundant workers were ofien channeled directly into early 
retirement. At the same time, other career risks - such as downward 
occupational mobility - have remained very low in Hungary, but not in 
Estonia, where downward mobility is relatively widespread and strongly 
dependent on the economic cycle, reflecting the liberal market and welfare 
strategy applied afier the fall of the Iron Curtain. For Estonia, no pension 
income analyses were possible (due to data limitations), and those for 
Hungary were restricted to one survey year (2003). Thus, not much can be 
said on pension incomes for the two countries, except that pensioners in 
Estonia receive relatively low pensions resulting in high shares of poor 
households among the elderly, whereas Hungarians typically obtain pensions 
putting them aboye the poverty lineo Again due to data restrictions, almost no 
inferences can be drawn from the two country studies with respect to the 
development of inequalities between occupational classes or educational 
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groups. What can be stated is that unemployment and early retirement .risks 
are clearly structured by education in both countries. Whereas there IS no 
change in inequalities of unemployment risks across cohorts in Estonia, a 
slight significant increase was detected for Hungary. In contrast, no change ~n 
inequalities was found for early retirement risks in Hungary; for Estoma 
change of inequalities over time was not analyzed for this transition. 
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
The starting point of this edited volume is the assumption that globalization 
and the aging of populations have changed the lives of older people in 
modem societies. Globalization has markedly accelerated market processes 
and economic restruduring since the 1980s. As outlined in our introductory 
chapter, these developments should have an aboye average impact on older 
workers, because they are overrepresented in those industries and jobs that 
have come under competitive pressure. Indeed, especially Continental and 
Southem European societies have reacted to this growing discrepancy 
between the demands of globalized labor markets and the limited possibilities 
to adapt older employees and their qualification profiles by engaging in the 
massive use and expansion of early retirement options in order to relieve 
nationallabor markets and adjust to accelerated economic transformations in 
a socially peaceful way. As a result, a sharp decline in old age emplo~ent 
rates could be observed in modem societies for several decades (Kohh et al. 
1991; Blossfeld, Buchholz and Hofácker 2006; Ebbinghaus 2000, 2008). All 
in all, older people have been pushed and lured systematically out. of 
employment, especially in Continental and Southem Europe, by offenng 
them generous and attractive early retirement programs. . 
Yet, one ofthe major challenges facing European and Northem Amencan 
societies today is their severe demographic aging. The increasing share of 
older people puts pension systems under substantial pressure because of the 
rising imbalance between those claiming pensions and those contributing to 
the pension system. This makes it necessary to maintain older p~ople in 
employment instead of sending them into early retirement.. Indee.d, lt can be 
observed that in the more recent past, governrnents have tned to mcrease the 
labor market atiachment of older employees by retrenching early retirement 
benefits. However, it is an open question whether the various reforms are 
effective and successful. In particular, it is necessary to investigate whether 
all older workers are really able to meet the expectation of the latest reforms 
to prolong working life or whether specific parts of the older population, in 
particular the lower qualified, fail to find appropriate jobs. If the latter 
scenario holds, social inequalities will rise. 
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Figure 12.1 Employment instability and economic insecurity in late lije -
general level, development across time, and consequences ¡or 
social inequalities 
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As the country studies in this edited volume have shown, there is no 
general trend toward increasing employment instabilities and economic 
uncertainty in late life. In fact, in most of the countries under study, late 
careers and retirement are still very secure for large parts of the older 
population. All in all, it can be said that despite pension reforms, no 
significant overall worsening of the situation for pensioners has taken place 
so far in the countries analyzed. Nonetheless, the main reason for this is that 
older people have managed to remain employed because of either, first, the 
favorable context of the economic upswing that started during the second half 
of the 1990s in many of the countries, second, the buffering effect of social 
policies aimed to either reintegrate unemployed workers into the labor market 
or to offer them an easy way out via early retirement, or, third, the cohorts 
under study have be,n able to compensate for late career risks by having 
experienced a good employrnent situation in their early and mid-careers. 
However, we also observed a growth of intra-cohort inequalities in countries 
that have already retrenched early retirement programs for recent cohorts of 
pensioners and display a stronger privatization of pension systems. 
Yet, as outlined in our introductory chapter, we did not expect a uniform 
and univocal trend toward more insecurity in late life across all countries. 
Actually, we expected strong variations between countries dependent on their 
specific historically grown institutional backgrounds. In line with this 
expectation, the empirical studies in this book have captured quite 
remarkable cross-country differences, indicating that country-specific welfare 
institutions as well as national employrnent and occupational systems have 
played a major role in shaping aH the above-mentioned processes and 
supporting the idea that national policies are able to aHeviate or aggravate 
inequalities (see, for a summary overview, Figure 12.1). 
EspeciaHy in countries with a high level of privatization and 
individualization of risks (Le., the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Estonia after the faH of the Iron Curtain), we find a strong market 
dependency of employrnent stability and economic well-being in late life. 
Also, social inequalities have traditionaHy been very strong due to the passive 
role of the welfare state. AH in aH, these countries directly pass on the effects 
of globalization to the micro-level, making individual s strongly dependent on 
macro-economic developments. 
In contrast, despite sorne variation between different welfare regimes, late 
life was weH-protected for a long time in Northem, Central and Southem 
Europe. However, in the more recent past, we find hints of a growth in social 
inequalities that seem to be related to the latest changes in pension 
regulations. In the social democratic countries of Scandinavia, the 
universalistic and active welfare state traditionally kept employrnent risks 
and economic uncertainty on a very low level for the whole population, 
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including the elderIy. However, as the Danish and Swedish country studies 
have shown, these countries also reveal a moderate increase of inequalities, 
partly driven - as the Swedish study has shown - by efforts to privatize 
pensions. The same is true for the conservative regime (as well as Hungary 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain) that provided strong and generous support 
for early retirement for several decades, but recently introduced several 
reforms expecting people to prolong working life. Older people now have to 
pay the price and face asevere reduction of their pensions if they fail to find 
appropriate employrnent at the end oftheir career and retire early. Indeed, the 
German country study (which was already able to cover the effects ofthese 
reforms in its data) has shown that market risks are increasingly privatized in 
late life and social inequalities have been rising. Whereas in earlier periods, 
lower qualified and less successful employees were also cushioned against 
market risks by very attractive earIy retirement options, they are now left 
'empty-handed' because they can neither claim the formerIy generous 
pensions nor face good job prospects. It can be expected that these 
inequalities will increase even more in the future because the effects of the 
latest pension reforms will impact even more strongly on today's middle-
aged workers. 
The Southem European welfare states of Italy and Spain are a remarkable 
exception in Europe and in our study. In these countries, govemments left the 
generous retirement programs mostly untouched for recent and immediately 
succeeding cohorts of the insiders of the welfare and labor market systems. 
As the authors have shown in their country studies, there is hardly any 
change observable until now. Instead, it is especially the young generation 
thatis burdened and hardly compensated for risks by the fragmented welfare 
states ofItaly and Spain. 
Comparing these results with those obtained from our earlier research 
(Blossfeld et al. 2005, 2008), it can be said that institutions protect the elderIy 
better than the younger workers from the effects of globalization, especially 
in Europe. However, future research will have to see whether this also applies 
for the forthcoming generations of retirees. Our results suggest that this will 
no longer be the case, because early retirement programs and public pensions 
are being increasingly retrenched. This impacts especially on the lower 
qualified who are currently being pushed out of employment and are thus 
unable to meet the expectation of the latest reforms to postpone retirement. 
However, this may well change as soon as companies and govemments start 
to feel the effects of increasing labor shortages due to declining fertility and 
demographic aging. These will probably make it necessary and possible to 
maintain less qualified older people in employment as well instead of 
pushing them out ofthe labor market. 
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NOTES 
1. The participation of Dr. Alberto Veira-Ramos in tbis project was made possible by a 
postdoctoral grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) in 
cooperation with tbe Spanish Foundation for Science and Research (FECYT), (ID: 2008-
0886). 
2. The Hungarian study observed persons after tbey turned 40 because retirement began to take 
place at earlier ages. 
3. For !taly, analyses were conducted on unemployrnent risks, but not on income mobility in tbe 
late career. 
4. Unemployrnent risks and reemployrnent chances were studied for the United States but not 
for tbe United Kingdom. 
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